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I Articles I




In the area of comparative studies, the Italian intelligence
establishment should be a matter of interest for jurists, political scientists,
and intelligence professionals of various nationalities. Regrettably, this
topic has to date drawn primarily the attention of the media, both in Italy
and abroad, with a focus on alleged institutional abuses and conspiracy
theories.'
* Vittorfranco S. Pisano currently teaches intelligence and security courses at the
University of Malta's Link Campus in Rome, Italy. A specialist in international security
affairs and author of numerous books and articles, Dr. Pisano has been a consultant of the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism and a reviewer of courses offered
by the U.S. Department of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program. A former Senior
Legal Specialist with the European Law Division of Library of Congress, he holds a
Master of Comparative Law from Georgetown University and a Doctoral Degree in
Juridical Science from the University of Rome, with a dissertation in comparative legal
systems, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He retired from the U.S. Army
as a colonel in 1996, after serving on extended active duty in various international
assignments in Europe.
1. The influence of journalistic accounts and instant books, nearly always with a
pronounced ideological and partisan slant, has been so pervasive that even technical
studies produced outside of Italy reflect an emphasis on alleged misconduct. See JEFFREY
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The political climate in which the Italian intelligence establishment
has operated in the past and continues to operate today is indeed
significant. However, commensurate attention should be devoted to the
technical aspects regarding the organization and functions of the
pertinent intelligence services, to the findings of the courts, and to the
parliamentary hearings regarding charges of misconduct, whether of
domestic origin or, as often claimed, externally induced.
The author of this article, formerly a Senior Legal Specialist with
the European Law Division of the Library of Congress in Washington,
D.C., had the opportunity to examine, translate, and analyze the current
Italian intelligence law shortly after its enactment, which dates back to
1977, for the Select Committees on Intelligence of both Houses of the
2U.S. Congress. These Congressional committees were primarily
interested in acquiring comparative insights entailing foreign legislative
and political experiences and initiatives. At the time, Italy constituted a
particularly interesting case study on account of chronic governmental
instability, the emergence of "Eurocommunism," the onslaught of
domestic terrorism and its international connections, the subversive
infiltration of the pacifist movement within the context of the Cold War,
and the enactment of legislation that led to a major intelligence reform.
This appears to be a particularly opportune time to reconsider the
nature of the Italian intelligence establishment and to discuss the
proposed amendments, because the Italian Parliament is expected to
finally debate and vote upon the latest of a series of proposed
amendments to the intelligence law of 1977. The present legislature was
inaugurated in 2001.
In light of the complexity of the Italian system of government and
sociopolitical scene, it is advisable in the interest of clarity and
perspective to address these significant factors, by way of a concise
overview, prior to describing and commenting upon the Italian
intelligence establishment and applicable legislation.
II. The Italian System of Government
The Constitution of the Republic of Italy, which replaced the
monarchist constitutional order after the demise of the Kingdom of Italy
on June 2, 1946, was drafted in 1947 and became effective on January 1,
1948.'
T. RICHELSON, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS, 101-125 (1988).
2. Vittorfranco S. Pisano, A Study of the Restructured Italian Intelligence and
Security Services (1978) and Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and
Countermeasures (1979), (both prepared under the auspices of the European Law
Division, Law Library, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.).
3. The formation of the Kingdom of Italy as an independent and sovereign state
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It is a compromise document drawn up by the political forces
elected to the Constituent Assembly that had contributed to the defeat of
Fascist loyalists and Nazi occupation troops during the latter part of
World War II, usually referred to in Italy as the Resistenza and covering
the 1943-45 period. These political forces included Christian Democrats
(Catholics), Socialists and Communists (Marxists), and members of
several smaller parties as heterogeneous as the major ones.
Little did they share in common beyond their intent to prevent the
recurrence of Fascism, whose dictatorial rule from 1922 to 1943 had
established a nearly all-powerful executive branch of government. In
order to achieve this objective, the Constituent Assembly adopted for
Italy a parliamentary system, characterized by the preeminence of the
legislative branch, rather than a presidential democracy. An ancillary
objective was to insure an incisive role for each of the parties with their
ideologically discordant platforms represented in the Constituent
Assembly, and subsequently in various organs of government.
The Constitution confers the legislative power upon a bicameral
Parliament consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the
Republic. The Parliament is the only central organ of the Italian
government elected directly by the people. In turn, it elects for a seven-
year term the President of the Republic, who is the head of State. The
head of Government, however, is a role assigned by the Constitution to
the President of the Council of Ministers. In accordance with the
parliamentary system, each Chamber is also empowered to grant or deny
a vote of confidence to the Government, which consists of the President
of the Council of Ministers and of the Ministers. Whenever this approval
is not granted or is withdrawn, the Government must resign.
In addition to the power to make laws and to the powers already
discussed, the Chambers may declare a state of war and confer the
attendant powers on the Council of Ministers; authorize the ratification
of treaties by the President of the Republic; approve the budget
submitted by the Council of Ministers; make inquiries into matters of
public interest; impeach the President of the Republic, the President of
the Council of Ministers, or any member of the Council; and appoint,
through a majority vote, a number of members of the Constitutional
Court4 and of the Superior Council of the Judiciary.5
was achieved in 1861 under the dynasty of Savoy, whose territorial expansion brought
about national unification, the Risorgimento. Full unification had to wait until the end of
World War I, Italy's fourth and final war of independence. Under the Kingdom, Italy
was governed by a constitutional charter, Statuto, originally granted to the pre-unification
Kingdom of Piedmont by its monarch, Charles Albert of Savoy, in 1848.
4. The Constitutional Court, specifically created by the Constituent Assembly as a
constitutional safeguard and composed of 15 members (one-third appointed by the
2003]
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The Council of Ministers is a collegiate organ. Its members are
jointly responsible for the acts of the Council and are also individually
responsible for their own Ministries (i.e., executive departments). The
President of the Council of Ministers, often referred to as the Prime
Minister, or increasingly simply as the Premier, is appointed by the
President of the Republic, who also appoints the Ministers at the
proposal of the Premier. Although the Premier and the other Ministers
are almost invariably members of Parliament, this is not a constitutional
requirement. The Premier, as the head of Government or chief national
executive, must maintain "unity of political and administrative control by
promoting and coordinating the activities of the Ministers."
6
In addition to having the power to appoint the Council of Ministers,
the President of the Republic may also dissolve one or both Chambers of
Parliament prior to the expiration of their five-year term in order to call
new elections. All acts of the President of the Republic must bear the
countersignature of the Minister or Ministers who propose the act and
assume responsibility for it.
The Constitution also calls for a unitary state as opposed to a federal
system of government. Local governments, Regions, Provinces, and
Municipalities, enjoy limited legislative and regulatory powers.
In consonance with its unitary-state structure, Italy has a unified
national court system that is part of the central government. No courts
are part of the local bodies of government.
Prosecutors enjoy the status of members of the judiciary,
magistratura, and the same constitutional prerogatives as judges.
Although an integral part of the judicial system, their functions are
regarded as administrative rather than judicial. It follows that a member
of the judiciary assigned to the Office of the Prosecutor cannot perform
judicial functions until such time as he/she is returned to the bench. The
organization, including jurisdiction and venue, of the Office of the
Prosecutor is parallel to that of the courts. The Ministry of Justice,
which prior to the enactment of the current Constitution exercised
Parliament), judges disputes regarding the unconstitutionality of State and regional
legislation and settles conflicts between State authorities, the State and the Regions, or
between Regions. It also has jurisdiction over charges of misconduct against the
President of the Council of Ministers and the Ministers. This court should not be
confused with the Supreme Court of Cassation, which is the ultimate appellate court
(judge of law rather than fact) in all proceedings not involving constitutional issues.
5. This organ, intended to insure the independence of the judiciary and composed
of three ex officio and 21 appointed members (one-third by the Parliament), has the
responsibility, pursuant to Art. 105 of the Constitution, "to designate, appoint, transfer,
and promote members of the judiciary and to adopt disciplinary measures regarding
them, in accordance with the rules of the judicial organization."
6. COST. [Constitution] art. 95.
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operational control over the Office of the Prosecutor, now merely
oversees the legitimacy of its functions.
Police forces that are organized by and operate within the
jurisdiction of the local bodies of government, primarily at the municipal
level, enjoy limited resources and their functions are substantially
administrative in nature, including traffic control and the enforcement of
local ordinances.
At the national level there are five major police organizations which
carry out their functions throughout the national territory and whose
powers to enforce the Criminal Code and complementary statutes exists
throughout the entire national territory.
These forces, State Police, Carabinieri, Finance Guard, Penitentiary
Police, and State Forestry Corps, are organized and administered by the
respective Ministry to which they are assigned by law. But for purposes
of public order, security, and safety, their employment is coordinated by
the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible, inter alia, for crime
prevention and law enforcement.
7
In consonance with legal terminology, Italian police manuals
classify the police as the Public Force and proceed to consider it from the
perspective of its technical functions: security police, administrative
police, judicial police, and confinement police. 8 The first two functions
fall under the purview of the pertinent executive departments of the
Government, while the remaining two are subject to the jurisdiction of
the judicial branch.
The term "judicial police" is purely a functional one and refers to
the most complex and exacting mission of the Public Force. This
mission is carried out by members of the police forces, and by certain
other public officials having limited police functions, in the performance
of their duties following the commission of a crime. The Code of
Criminal Procedure distinguishes between officers and agents of the
judicial police, in most cases on the basis of their rank. It further places
them under the direct supervision of the Office of the Prosecutor. No
transfer, suspension from judicial police functions, or promotion of
7. The State Police is the law enforcement agency of the Ministry of the Interior.
The Arma dei Carabinieri is a military police force, also vested with civil jurisdiction,
organized under the Ministry of Defense. As opposed to the State Police and Carabinieri,
whose responsibilities are quite broad, the Finance Guard, a militarily organized agency
under the Ministry of Economics and Finance, is specifically tasked with the prevention
and repression of crimes related to tax evasion. Like the Finance Guard, the Penitentiary
Police, under the Ministry of Justice, and the State Forestry Corps, under the Ministry for
Agricultural and Forestry Policies, are assigned the specific missions reflected in their
names. All five national police forces can, however, be commanded to perform, as
needed, general police duties.
8. See Scuola Ufficiali Carabinieri, Sinossi di Tecnica Professionale, (Rome 1975).
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judicial police officers and agents may take place without the
concurrence of the prosecutor to whose District they are assigned.
The members of the national police forces vested with judicial
police functions do not lose their judicial police status when assigned to
other police duties. While performing other duties, they are not under
the supervision of the Office of the Prosecutor, but report to their
ordinary chain of command. 9
III. National Political Dynamics of Italy
Today there is an unofficial tendency to divide Italy's post-World
War II constitutional and political history into two periods: the First
Republic, 1948-93, and the Second Republic, 1993 or 1994 to date.
While not precise from a constitutional standpoint and only approximate
from a temporal standpoint, this distinction is nonetheless indicative of
certain developments and trends.
The complexity of the parliamentary system and of the procedures
consecrated in the Constitution were magnified during the First Republic
by the re-emergence and longevity (at times accompanied by mere
changes in party labels) of numerous and heterogeneous political parties
and their ancillary organizations, affiliated labor unions and various other
associations, including within the judiciary, after the collapse of the
Fascist imposed one-party system.10
The multi-party system is largely but not exclusively attributable to
the ideological fractionalization of Italian society and to the benefits to
be derived from political patronage at various levels of government. In
fact, proportional electoral laws have greatly facilitated and encouraged
the multiparty system.
From the enactment of the Constitution in 1948 until the beginning
of the 1990s, proportional electoral laws, also dating back to 1948, made
it possible for the following parties to be represented in both Chambers
of Parliament and in the local bodies of government: Christian
Democratic Party (the major national party and primarily centrist in
orientation but with strong internal factions of the left), Communist Party
(consistently the second largest party), Socialist Party (with a
Communist-oriented component), Social Democratic Party, Republican
Party (center-left), Radical Party (libertarian), Liberal Party (secular and
9. The organization and functions of the judicial police are governed by Title III,
Articles 55-58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
10. The Constitution does specifically prescribe the right of citizens to form and join
political parties as well as labor unions. A very detailed and programmatic document,
consisting of 139 articles, the Constitution addresses a very broad spectrum of "rights and
duties of citizens" under the headings of civil, ethical-social, economic, and political
relations. COST. [Constitution] art. 13-54.
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conservative), and Social Movement (often termed neo-Fascist), as well
as additional small parties of the extreme left or representative of
regional interests. The history of these parties includes both schisms and
mergers.
Throughout the First Republic, electoral returns gave the Christian
Democrats a relative majority status at the national level. However, in
the absence of an absolute majority, it was necessary to form
parliamentary coalitions, manifestly based on compromise and frequently
in contradiction with electoral platforms, in order to pass legislation and
to express the vote of confidence for equally heterogeneous coalition
Governments. Moreover, since the 1953 parliamentary elections,
coalitions enjoyed small and, therefore, uncomfortable margins over the
opposition.
Nuances and imaginative ad hoc terminology notwithstanding,
coalition formulas of that period may be roughly summarized as follows:
centrist (1948-62), center-left (1962-72), centrist (1972-73), center-left
1973-76, center-left with unprecedented external direct or indirect
Communist support (1976-79), and a subsequent arrangement among
centrists, conservatives, and leftists to the exclusion of the Communist
Party and its successors (1979-1993). The precarious nature of these
formulas caused, during the same period, the succession of 47
Governments or national executives, in addition to the dissolution of
Parliament five times by the President of the Republic without leading to
more stable results with the recourse to early elections.
The blatant ideological clash between democratic forces, however
diverse, and the Communist Party, flanked by its fellow travelers,
characterized the First Republic. The internal Italian situation,
aggravated by the presence of the largest and most influential
Communist party in the free world, paralleled the USA-USSR and the
NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontations.
The Communist Party, which never became part of the national
executive, represented the major opposition force at the national level. It
ruled in several local governments, joined the ruling parliamentary
majority in supporting certain legislation, strongly conditioned
governance, and made inroads into every walk of Italian society. The
Communist Party made significant inroads in the labor movement, mass
media, and educational-cultural affairs. It was successful in creating
alliances with non-Communist forces, particularly, but not only, at the
labor union level, that could seriously challenge parliamentary and
governmental conduct. Moreover, its foreign policy stance ranged from
total alignment with the Soviet Union to ambiguous attitudes and
2003]
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pronouncements, especially with respect to NATO and military issues. 1
The fear caused by the presence of a strong and pervasive
Communist Party, coupled with the possibility of a Communist political
victory at the national level, largely accounts for the continued relative
majority status of the Christian Democratic Party throughout the First
Republic, as opposed to a genuine commitment to its platform by the
majority of its electorate.
The First Republic was further marred by disruptive and violent
demonstrations as well as serious and repetitive acts of domestic
terrorism, mainly from the extra-parliamentary left but also from the
extra-parliamentary right. The Marxist and non-Marxist parliamentary
left, including Catholic elements, systematically attributed the unlawful
behavior of the extra-parliamentary left to disguised rightist initiatives
and repeatedly ascribed these actions to homegrown and/or international
conspiracies.
In this connection, the entire left conducted a great deal of
propaganda that advocated the principle of anti-Fascist national unity by
the so-called "constitutional spectrum" (arco costituzionale) against the
specter of a Fascist takeover. As a consequence, the aforementioned
Social Movement, a regularly elected party usually ranking fourth in
parliamentary representation, was de facto barred from participation in
any parliamentary coalition or other meaningful political arrangement
because it was viewed as neo-Fascist.
Just as the Communist Party constituted the principal parliamentary
opposition of the left, the Social Movement played a similar, though
weak, opposition role from the rightist side of the political spectrum.
Elements that considered the Communist Party and the Social Movement
insufficiently committed to their respective ideologies and rhetoric
frequently would desert these parties to join more radical and extra-
parliamentary forces. 12
Often referred to as the "passage from the First to the Second
Republic," the 1990s ushered in what appears to be a prolonged period of
institutional and political transition. It was characterized by (1)
amendments to the national electoral laws, which reduced proportional
11. For an analysis in English of Communist Party attitudes toward NATO with
particular reference to the 1976 parliamentary elections campaign, whose returns gave
that party an unprecedented 34.4% of the vote (thus trailing the relative majority
Christian Democratic Party by only four percentage points), See JAMES E. DAUGHERTY &
DIANE K. PFALTZGRAFF, EUROCOMMUNISM AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, (Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Mass., 1977).
12. For a detailed survey of the Italian system of government, political players and
mechanics, and threats to national security during nearly the entire duration of the First
Republic, See Vittorfranco S. Pisano, The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in
Contemporary Italy, Hoover, Stanford, Cal. (1987).
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representation to 25% in the Chamber of Deputies and further introduced
a 4% threshold for a candidate to achieve election; (2) initial steps
toward constitutional reform and transformation from a unitary state to a
federal system of government; (3) the demise of the political parties of
the past, including the Christian Democratic Party and the Communist
Party, under the weight of the "new world order" brought about by the
end of the Cold War, on the one hand, and judicial investigations into
kickbacks obtained for individual and party financing on the other; (4)
the emergence of new political parties, which draw their support from the
disoriented electorate of no longer viable parties; (5) switches of
allegiance by elected representatives from one party to another; (6) the
break up of party coalitions; and (7) unprecedented public and media
focus on individual political leaders, including their background and
personality.
Changes in the international setting, with the demise of the bipolar
world, also catapulted Italy into a role of greater responsibility in the
Mediterranean and Balkan regions and even beyond, including
peacekeeping and humanitarian commitments entailing the deployment
of armed forces abroad.
Under the Second Republic, six Governments have succeeded one
another from 1994 to the time of this article in October 2002. Moreover,
early elections were called twice, in 1994 and again in 1996. Both early
elections were in accordance with the revised electoral laws of 1993. As
opposed to the past, party coalitions as well as overall coalition leaders,
in essence candidates for the office of Premier, were announced in
advance to the electorate.
Whereas the number of political parties has by no means diminished
and party platforms do not reflect absolute homogeneity, relatively well-
defined coalition blocs have emerged with the possible result of
producing greater political stability in the long run. However, internal
bickering continues to exist in the coalitions.
The current political spectrum substantially revolves around two
"poles," as they are called, which provide alternatives within a roughly
bipolar system. The center-right pole won the parliamentary elections in
1994. It was more of a cartel than a coalition and it broke up seven
months later. This center-right Government was consequently replaced
by a center-left one. The center-left pole was the winner in 1996 and
ruled through the end of the regular five-year term legislature. The
center-right Government won in 2001. This time it was more unified and
it obtained a comfortable majority.
The present majority, governing Italy since its election in 2001,
belongs, as indicated, to the center-right pole. It is led by Forza Italia,
literally "Go Italy," the basically centrist relative majority party, which
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also attracts former conservatives and progressives. The center-right
pole further includes in order of electoral returns, the National Alliance,
the former Social Movement, which has since renounced all neo-Fascist
vestiges and now draws support from conservatives and former centrists;
the Northern League which is a regional coalition attracting a federalism-
oriented and substantially conservative electorate from the Northeast;
and the Christian Democratic Center and the United Christian
Democrats, both made up of former Christian Democrats heretofore
representing the centrist and conservative internal factions of the defunct
Christian Democratic Party. Contrary to its center-left opponent, the
center-right pole has maintained the same coalition leader since 1994,
Silvio Berlusconi of Forza Italia, now serving as Premier for the second
time.
The center-left pole, which governed the country from the mid-
1990s to 2001, is currently preoccupied with maintaining an alliance
between four key groups and several minor formations. The first key
group is the Democrats of the Left which is the major successor of the
Communist Party as well as the largest party of the no longer Marxist left
and of the left as a whole. The second party is Democracy and Liberty,
which is the major successor of the leftist component of the Christian
Democratic Party. The third party is the Greens. The Popular Party,
which is another leftist oriented successor of the Christian Democratic
Party, is the final key party.
The center-right governing majority is further opposed by two other
successors of the defunct Communist Party. These Communist loyalists,
contrary to the Democrats of the Left whose political stance no longer
includes the rhetoric of the past, are the Communist Refoundation Party
and the Party of Italian Communists, whose direct and indirect support
has, nonetheless, been accepted by the center-left pole during its period
of governance under the Second Republic. The Party of Italian
Communists also held ministerial posts as a coalition partner during the
last legislature.
From a security standpoint, the Second Republic has experienced a
recrudescence, for the time being at comparatively minor levels, of
domestic terrorism. The more menacing manifestations of terrorism
have issued from Marxist-Leninist and anarchist components of the
extreme left. Other security and public order threats and challenges
entail unlawful actions by transplanted radical Islamic elements and
domestic and foreign "no-global" protesters, as well as agitation
conducted by parties and extra-parliamentary aggregations claiming to
act in the name of pacifist and ecological values.'
3
13. For a survey, in English, of these developments See Vittorfranco Pisano,
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IV. Italian Intelligence Prior to the Reform Law of 1977
Both the current intelligence and security services, instituted in
1977, and their immediate predecessors trace their origin to the Military
Intelligence Service, Servizio Informazioni Militari (SIM), which was
organized in 1927 under the Fascist regime.
SIM comprised two main branches, one tasked with intelligence
collection and analysis, including espionage, and another with
counterespionage. SIM was in practice subordinate to the Deputy Chief
of Staff of the Army for the performance of strictly military functions
and to the Undersecretary of War for the performance of non-military
duties, although its sphere of action had generally been limited to
military objectives. 14  This service was dissolved in 1944 and was
replaced for a few years by a small intelligence office in the General
Staff. The Fascist regime also ran a secret police, which was totally
separate from SIM, called OVRA. 15 The secret police disappeared with
the fall of Fascism without any need for a formal dissolution act because
there is no known official record of its creation.
From 1949 until the passage of the reform law of 1977, two
intelligence services succeeded one other.
Instituted on September 1, 1949, the first was the Armed Forces
Intelligence Service, Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate (SIFAR),
organized under the Ministry of Defense as a military intelligence
service. However, three additional services connected to SIFAR were
established within the Army, Navy, and Air Force for intelligence
collection and analysis of specific interest to each of the three military
organizations. All of these services were termed Operational and
Current Intelligence Service, Servizio Informazioni Operative e
Situazione (SIOS), but were followed by the designator "Army," "Navy,"
or "Air Force" to identify their respective parent organization.
In the mid-1960s, SIFAR became the object of sharp criticism
"Terrorist Revival in Italy?" (pts. 1 & 2), Essecome International Magazine (Bologna),
June and Sept. 2001., See also Vittorfranco Pisano, "Transnational Terrorism in Italy",
Essecome International Magazine (Bologna), Feb. 2002.
14. SIM is credited, by both Italian and non-Italian sources, with operational
efficiency, including the forecasting of the Anglo-American landing in North Africa, a
contingency not considered by German intelligence, and the penetration of the British
naval ciphers in the Mediterranean. See Domenico Bartoli, Gli Italiani nella Terra di
Nessuno, Mondadori 167-168 (Milan 1976)., See also Richelson, supra note 1, at 106.
15. According to some sources, the expansion of this acronym is unknown. See
Ambrogio Viviani, I Servizi Segreti in Italia, 1815-1985 450 (Adnkronos, Rome).
According to other sources, it stands for Organization for the Surveillance and
Suppression of Anti-Fascism (Opera Vigilanza Repressione Antifascismo). See
Francesco Paolo Fulci, "Informazione e Sicurezza: Il Ruolo del CESIS," Informazioni
della Difesa 49 (Rome, No. 2, Mar.-Apr. 1992).
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because of actual or alleged deviations from institutional functions. As a
result, several officers were transferred out of the more sensitive offices
of SIFAR and the service itself was renamed Defense Intelligence
Service, Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID), on June 25, 1965.
Although the basic organization and functions of SID appear to
have remained the same as those of its predecessor, two directives having
legislative and regulatory force, respectively, were issued.
The first directive was Article 2(g) of President of the Republic
Decree No. 1477 of November 18, 1965. Pursuant to Article 2(g), SID
was "to carry out, through its offices and units, intelligence duties
relating to the protection of military secrecy and to every other activity of
national interest for the defense and security of the country; and to take
appropriate measures for the prevention of actions harmful to the defense
potential of the country."
The second directive, a Ministry of Defense Circular of June 25,
1966, assigned to SID the operational duties to "collect at home and
abroad all useful information for defense and national security; organize
and conduct operations against foreign intelligence activities and against
every other activity that might be dangerous or damaging to national
defense and security; follow and keep abreast of the political, economic-
industrial, military, and scientific condition of foreign countries of
interest; and to insure the protection of military secrecy and other state
secrets. 16
The SID structure included three basic branches: "R" was
responsible for intelligence collection abroad and political and military
espionage; "S" was responsible for processing and analysis of data
collected by section "R"; and "D" was responsible for counterespionage,
including all operations in Italy. Moreover, "D" was territorially
subdivided into 23 counterespionage detachments, each commanded by a
field-grade officer of the Carabinieri. "D" was made up almost
exclusively of Carabinieri personnel. The other two branches, "R" and
"S," included primarily military personnel from other arms and services.
The organization and functions of SIOS within the Army, Navy, and
Air Force remained unchanged after SIFAR was transformed into SID.
SIOS was responsible for at least a part of the intelligence information
acquired abroad.
Prior to the intelligence reform of 1977, intelligence personnel
already vested with the status of officers and agents of the judicial police,
essentially Carabinieri, retained this status while assigned to SIFAR or
16. Both directives quoted above are drawn from Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei
Deputati,, V Legislatura, Doc. XXIII, N. 1, Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sugli
Avvenimenti del Giugno-Luglio 1964, 1361-1362 (Rome 1971).
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SID and could conduct law enforcement functions directed at the
repression of crimes. The Carabinieri assigned to SIFAR and later to
SID were therefore contemporaneously intelligence and law enforcement
officers.
Accusations of even greater magnitude than those leveled against its
predecessor, coupled with the perceived need to modernize the
intelligence system, brought about the dissolution of SID with the
enactment of the intelligence reform in 1977."
V. Current Legislation Governing the Italian Intelligence
Establishment
Law No. 801 of October 24, 1977 on the Formation and
Organization of the Intelligence and Security Services and the
Regulation of the State Secret, hereafter referred to as the Intelligence
Law, currently governs the structure and functions of the Italian
intelligence establishment.'
8
The Intelligence Law repealed specifically all regulations and/or
internal directives contrary to its provisions. It also prohibits the
performance of any intelligence or security activity outside the
instruments, procedures, tasks, and objectives called for in its text.
The report of the special committee that examined the various bills
introduced in the Parliament before the passage of the Intelligence Law
reflects Italy's reliance upon the experience and intelligence models of
other allied and democratic countries.19
The Intelligence Law has in fact introduced four major innovations
into the Italian intelligence system. First, more stringent supervision of
the intelligence establishment by the Government or national executive
and, for the first time, by the Parliament or national legislature exists.
Second, two separate services responsible for foreign intelligence and
internal security, respectively, were created. The third innovation is the
separation of intelligence and security functions from judicial police or
law enforcement functions. Finally, new regulations governing State
secrecy exist. Each of these innovations warrants more detailed
explanation.
17. A rather detailed and ostensibly political bias free account of Italian intelligence,
particularly prior to the 1977 reform, is provided by Viviani, op. cit., supra note 15.
Viviani, an Army general officer, served in counterintelligence.
18. The text of this law was published in Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica
ltaliana [Official Law Gazette of the Republic of Italy], No. 303, 8055 (Nov. 7, 1977).
For an english translation, See Vittorfranco Pisano, A Study of the Restructured Italian
Intelligence and Security Services, App. I, supra note 2.
19. Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura, Disegni di Legge e
Relazioni, N. 696-385-1033-1086-1087-A, Relazione della Conmissione Speciale
Concernente Istituzione e Ordinamento del Servizio per la Informazione e la Sicurezza.
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A. More Stringent Oversight
The President of the Council of Ministers (Premier) is now
responsible for intelligence and security policy as well as for the top
supervision of the intelligence and security services. The Premier is also
empowered to issue directives on organization and operations to the
intelligence and security services and to control the application and
protection of State secrecy. In essence, the responsibility for central
intelligence has been removed from the Ministry of Defense and has
been directly assigned to the Premier.
The Inter-ministerial Committee on Intelligence and Security,
Comitato Interministeriale per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza (CIIS),
instituted by the Intelligence Law, assists the Premier. CIIS is chaired by
the Premier and includes the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior,
Justice, Defense, Productive Activities (formerly Industry), and Finance
(which has since absorbed Treasury). It advises the Premier on general
directives and fundamental objectives of the intelligence and security
policy and makes proposals. The Premier may invite other Ministers, the
directors of the intelligence and security services and civilian and
military officials and experts to CIIS meetings.
In addition to CIIS, the Intelligence Law created an Executive
Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services, Comitato
Esecutivo per i Servizi di Informazione e di Sicurezza (CESIS), under the
direct authority of the Premier. CESIS is responsible for providing the
Premier with all data needed to coordinate the intelligence and security
services, as well as processed and analyzed information. Responsibility
for coordinating liaison with the intelligence and security services of
other countries is also assigned to CESIS.
The Premier, or an Undersecretary of State appointed by the former,
presides over CESIS. The Premier also determines the composition of
CESIS, which includes the Directors of the intelligence and security
services who are ex officio members. Although the Intelligence Law
calls only for a General Secretariat, it authorizes the Premier to organize
whatever other offices are strictly necessary. The General Secretariat is
headed by a Secretary General, who must be a public official of the
highest administrative grade. He or she is appointed and may be
dismissed by the Premier, after the opinion of CIIS is heard.
The Government, consisting of the President of the Council of
Ministers and the Ministers, must report in writing every six months to
the Parliament on intelligence and security policy, as well as on its
results.
The Intelligence Law also provides for a parliamentary committee
comprised of four Deputies and four Senators, to be appointed by the
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Speaker of their respective Chambers according to the principle of
proportionality (i.e., party representation in the Parliament). The purpose
of this committee, generally referred to as the Parliamentary Oversight
Committee, Comitato Parlamentare di Controllo, is to monitor the
application of the principles set forth in the Intelligence Law.
The Parliamentary Oversight Committee is entitled to request basic
information on the structure and activities of the intelligence and security
services from the Premier and CIIS. It can also make observations and
recommendations.
If the Premier avails himself of the power to claim the need for
State secrecy, which he must briefly substantiate, the Parliamentary
Oversight Committee may refer the matter, after an absolute majority
vote, to each Chamber of Parliament for the necessary political
evaluations.
The members of the Parliamentary Oversight Committee must
respect classified information to which they are exposed in the course of
their duties. The proceedings of the committee are also classified.
B. Creation of Two Separate Intelligence and Security Services
The foreign intelligence service, termed by the Intelligence Law as
the Service for Intelligence and Military Security, Servizio per le
Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI), is assigned all intelligence
and security functions pertaining to Italian military defense. SISMI also
carries out counterespionage duties.
SISMI is subordinate to the Minister of Defense, who is responsible
for structuring this service and for supervising its activities in keeping
with the directives of the Premier.
The Director of the service and the other functionaries to be
indicated in the table of organization or force structure of SISMI are
appointed by the Minister of Defense, subject to the concurring opinion
of CIIS.
SISMI must keep the Minister of Defense and also CESIS abreast of
all intelligence information and analyses in its possession and of all its
operations.
The Intelligence Law provides for the continued existence of all
those units and offices responsible for intelligence, security, and
estimates that operate within each armed service or corps of the State. At
the same time, the Intelligence Law explicitly restricts the functions of
these units and offices to duties of a technical-military or military-police
nature to be exercised within the specific confines of each armed service
or corps. These activities must also be conducted in strict liaison with
SISMI. Finally, the Intelligence Law repealed the previously cited
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Article 2(g) of the President of the Republic Decree No. 1477 of
November 18, 1965.
The internal security service, termed by the Intelligence Law as the
Service for Intelligence and Democratic Security, Servizio per le
Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica (SISDE), is assigned all
intelligence and security functions for the defense of the Italian
democratic State and of the institutions established by the Constitution.
SISDE is subordinate to the Minister of the Interior, who is
responsible for structuring this service and supervising its activities in
keeping with the directives of the Premier.
The Director and other functionaries of SISDE are appointed by the
Minister of the Interior in the manner indicated above for SISMI. SISDE
is also subject to the same reporting requirements established for SISMI.
The personnel of CESIS, SISMI, and SISDE include not only
civilian and military employees transferred, with their consent, to these
entities, but also those hired directly. CESIS, SISMI, and SISDE may
not employ, either permanently or occasionally, members of Parliament;
regional, provincial, or municipal councilors; members of the judiciary;
clergymen; or professional journalists.
Matters relating to personnel strength and organization, as well as to
the juridical and economic status of personnel assigned to CESIS,
SISMI, and SISDE, respectively, are regulated by the Premier, the
Minister of Defense, and the Minister of the Interior, subject to the
concurring opinion of CIIS. Provisions are also made for the utilization
by CESIS, SISMI, and SISDE of property assigned to governmental
departments and agencies.
The Intelligence Law imposes upon SISMI and SISDE the duty to
assist and cooperate with each other.
Individuals whose record does not guarantee their fidelity to
democratic and constitutional principles are barred from permanent or
occasional employment in CESIS, SISMI, and SISDE. Article 8 of the
Intelligence Law specifically requires "scrupulous fidelity to the
Republican and anti-Fascist Constitution."
C. Separation of the Intelligence and Security Function From Judicial
Police Powers.
Under the Intelligence Law, assignment to CESIS, SISMI, and
SISDE is not compatible with the status of officer or agent of the judicial
police. Consequently, personnel who hold that status in their parent
organization are suspended from that status for the duration of their
assignment to any of the above.
The members of the intelligence and security services must channel
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all reports, regardless of their nature, exclusively through their superiors
to the Directors of the pertinent services, who will in turn report to the
Ministers of Defense and of the Interior, respectively, as well as to the
Premier through CESIS.
The Directors of the intelligence and security services must also
provide the jurisdictionally competent organs of the judicial police with
information and evidence on matters that could constitute criminal
offenses. The performance of this duty may be delayed only with the
explicit consent of the Premier, when such delay is strictly necessary for
performing institutional functions of the intelligence and security
services.
All officers and agents of the judicial police are obliged to
cooperate fully with the intelligence and security services.
D. New Regulations on State Secrecy
The Intelligence Law imposes State secrecy on acts, documents,
information, activities, and matters where disclosure can damage the
State, including its democratic institutions, constitutional functions,
independence and sovereignty, military preparedness and defense, and
international agreements. Events directed at subverting the constitutional
order are excluded from State secrecy.
The Intelligence Law further imposes on all public officials the duty
to abstain from testifying on matters covered by State secrecy. If the
prosecuting authority does not consider the pertinent matter subject to
State secrecy, it questions the Premier, who must reply within 60 days
whenever he intends to uphold State secrecy.
The Premier must inform the Parliamentary Oversight Committee
every time he upholds State secrecy and must briefly provide basic
justification. If the absolute majority of the Parliamentary Committee
does not consider State secrecy warranted, the committee reports to each
Chamber for the necessary political evaluations. In any case, the Premier
must apprise each Chamber every time he imposes State secrecy.
The four innovations described above reflect the current basic
framework governing the organization and responsibilities of the Italian
intelligence and security services.
While no single organic regulation has been issued for the
implementation of the Intelligence Law, several individual provisions
have been adopted, particularly in the takeoff stage of the reformed
intelligence and security services.
On January 30, 1978, the Premier issued a Decree setting forth the
composition of CESIS to include the Chief of Staff of Defense, the Chief
of Police, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
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Commanding General of the Carabinieri, the Commanding General of
the Finance Guard, the Directors of SISMI and SISDE (both of whom
are ex officio members as provided for by the Intelligence Law), the
Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, and the Secretary General
of CESIS. Moreover, the same Decree empowers the first five
committee members listed above to designate a permanent
representative. It also empowers the Premier to summon CESIS as well
as representatives of other Ministries or public entities whenever the
subject matter of the discussion requires their presence.
On May 10, 1978, the Premier issued another Decree regarding the
functions of CESIS. Pursuant thereto, CESIS evaluates intelligence
information provided by SISMI and SISDE; makes recommendations to
the Premier regarding the coordination of SISMI and SISDE with other
public entities, as well as possible jurisdictional conflicts; determines
foreign intelligence and security services with which SISMI and SISDE
may establish contact and coordinates the pertinent relations; submits to
the Premier proposals regarding the intelligence and security policy to be
executed by SISMI and SISDE; and imparts directives for the utilization
of intelligence information.
In accordance with the same Decree, the Secretary General of
CESIS is answerable before the Premier for the actions of this
committee; sees to the execution of its resolutions; and issues directives
relating to the classification and storage of documents in the general
archives subject to his/her authority.
Moreover, pursuant to the earlier Decree of January 30,. 1978, the
Office for Internal Security, Ufficio Sicurezza Interna (USI), formerly
operating within SID, has been reestablished within the General
Secretariat of CESIS.
By Ministerial Decrees of May 3 and 6, 1978, respectively, the
Ministers of Defense and of the Interior defined the internal structure of
SISMI and SISDE.2°
Very limited information regarding their structure is generally
available in open sources. Journalistic accounts indicate that SISMI, in
particular, is structurally patterned after its predecessor, the above-
mentioned SID.21 It can be reasonably assumed, however, that, in
20. The Decrees of the President of the Council of Ministers and the Decrees of the
Minister of Defense and of the Minister of the Interior referred to above are mentioned
and summarized in the first semi-annual intelligence report to the Parliament. See
"Relazione sulla Politica Informativa e della Sicurezza e sui Risultati Ottenuti - Semestre
22 Novembre 1977-22 Maggio 1978," appended to Camera dei Deputati, Segreteria
Generale, Ufficio Stampa e Pubblicazioni, I Servizi di Sicurezza in Italia, Rome, 1988.
21. For example, a presumably dated (even if then accurate) 1993 newspaper
account reported that SISMI consisted of four numbered Departments - with subordinate
divisions - respectively tasked with the following duties: 1. Counterespionage and
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addition to pertinent command, personnel, logistics, and communications
sections, the internal structure of both SISMI and SISDE generally
corresponds to the fields of intelligence collection related to the basic
mission of each service. The fields of endeavor repeatedly discussed in
the semi-annual intelligence reports to the Parliament include:
developments in geopolitical areas of direct interest to Italy (which
remains basically a Mediterranean regional power), economic security,
international terrorism, domestic subversion and terrorism, clandestine
immigration, organized crime, advanced technology transfers,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, espionage, and other
concerns regarding the environment, information technology, and sects
and cults.
22
References to the personnel strength of SISMI and SISDE, as well
as CESIS, appear from time to time, presumably by way of
approximation, in the press. In 2001, SISMI reportedly employed 2,100
agents, researchers, and analysts, including approximately 100 abroad;
SISDE 2,300; and CESIS 800.23 A more 'recent account indicates that an
additional 100 military officers and civil servants have been detailed to
SISMI and SISDE in the latter part of 2002.24
In the early stages of implementation of the Intelligence Law,
personnel regulations were also set forth, including the prohibition to
carry out political or labor union activities, to engage in political
propaganda, and to join strikes. Furthermore, the provisions of the Code
of Military Justice were made applicable to all CESIS, SISMI, and
SISDE employees. Finally, all personnel are to be militarized in case of
war.
25
Implementing regulations further require that, during periods of
assignment to the intelligence and security services, military personnel
are to be civilianized, notwithstanding the applicability of the Code of
Military Justice. As odd as it may seem, this rule applies to SISMI
personnel as well. Reported exceptions pertain to the Directors, when
detailed from their parent military services. Presumably, the suspension
from military status follows criteria analogous to the suspension from
terrorism; II. Foreign operations; III. Communications and electronic security; and IV.
Logistics. The account also referred to subordinate "counterespionage centers" in various
Italian cities and to subordinate "foreign centers" in various capitals abroad. See II
Tempo (Rome), June 5, 1993, at 2.
22. Said subject-matter areas are also dealt with in the latest semi-annual report
available. See "Relazione sulla Politica Informativa e della Sicurezza - Secondo
Semestre 2001," published in Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica,
Per Aspera ad Veritatem (Rome), No. 2, Jan.-Apr. 2002.
23. Corriere della Sera (Milan), Aug. 30, 2001, at 2.
24. Corriere della Sera (Milan), Oct. 14, 2002, at 20.
25. Said regulations and provisions are cited in op. cit., supra note 20.
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judicial police status.
Subsequent directives, issued by the Premier in 1982 and again in
1987, attributed to the Secretary General of CESIS the role of prime and
principal associate of the Premier in the domain of intelligence and
security and stated that the Secretary General "exercises his functions
and powers so as to provide a unitary approach to the action of the two
[intelligence and security] services., 26
In 1995, the then Premier suspended all hiring by CESIS, SISMI,
and SISDE of personnel not already serving in a military or civilian
governmental capacity. This initiative was presented as a measure
against patronage and has since remained in force.
27
In 1997, the three SIOS's belonging to the Army, Navy, and Air
Force merged under the name of Intelligence and Security Department,
Reparto Informazioni Sicurezza (RIS). The merger allowed overall
coordination by the Chief of Staff of Defense, who is the equivalent of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States. They
contemporaneously remain subject to the pertinent provisions of the
28Intelligence Law.
With respect to the innovations introduced by the Intelligence Law,
the author of this article expressed a number of reservations in his reports
to U.S. Congressional committees shortly after its enactment. 29 Those
early reservations can be summarized as follows.
While positive in preventing possible abuses by the intelligence
and security services, governmental and parliamentary oversight
can contemporaneously create potential problems given the Italian
system of government and the workings of Italian politics. The
operational effectiveness of the restructured services could
become directly proportional to the stability of the Government.
The recurrence of endemic governmental crises could paralyze the
functioning of these services. Malfunction or even paralysis
could result from events ranging from the too frequent
appointment and dismissal of the Secretary General of CESIS and
of the Directors of SISMI and SISDE to changes in intelligence
and security policy following the formation of new parliamentary
majorities and/or the succession of each Premier and Council of
26. Fulci, op.cit., supra note 15, at 53. Fulci, an ambassador, has served as Secretary
General of CESIS.
27. Corriere della Sera (Milan), Aug. 12, 2001, at 5.
28. This development was brought about by Law No. 25 of February 18, 1997,
published in the Official Law Gazette of the Republic of Italy, No. 45, February 24, 1997,
which reformed the Defense or military establishment.
29. Op. cit., supra note 2.
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Ministers. The intelligence and security policy of the Premier
could also be conditioned by CIIS. Moreover, participation in
CIIS and/or the Parliamentary Oversight Committee by members
of parties without a clear commitment to the national security
policy could result in the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information and procedures.
* The attribution of the intelligence and security function to two
different services is not immune to potential drawbacks. Positive
operational results are dependent upon the degree of cooperation
between SISMI and SISDE and between the Ministries of Defense
and of the Interior, to which the two services are respectively
assigned, and - once again - upon the overall stability and
homogeneity of the Government. Moreover, the functions of the
two services could counterproductively overlap each other,
particularly with respect to the threat posed by situations entailing
actual or suspected links between domestically and externally
induced terrorism.
* The separation of the intelligence and security services from
judicial police requires, in turn, a high degree of cooperation
between the services and the various police forces. This
separation could cause a form of bipolarization with SISMI and
the Carabinieri on one side and SISDE and the State Police on the
other. Moreover, a certain degree of flexibility appears to be lost
and occasions for security leaks may increase.
" The regulation of State secrecy by the Intelligence Law could
result in friction between the Premier and the supporting
parliamentary coalition or other sectors of Parliament, thus
contributing to upsetting the generally precarious equilibrium of
Italian politics.
In reports to the U.S. Congress, this author concluded that the then
newly restructured intelligence and security system could impose
restrictions and/or courses of action of a political, rather than technical,
nature on the Premier to the detriment of the institutional functions and
efficiency of the two services. However, much would obviously and
ultimately depend on the implementation of the regulations of the
Intelligence Law.
To be sure, the above-outlined reservations were to a notable degree
due to the threat or risk posed by the Communist Party within the Italian
governmental and political system and the broader context of the Cold
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War. Such concerns were shared, and expressed in decidedly stronger
terms, by other observers even outside of Italy and of the United States.30
The demise of the Soviet Union and the changes brought about by the
Second Republic in Italy have removed that overriding concern. But, in
this author's judgment, the same reservations as well as additional ones,
will linger on, albeit to a lesser extent, at both the political and technical
levels, until such time as certain amendments are made to the
Intelligence Law.
In this connection, it is worth noting recent commentaries issuing
from various sources, including highly authoritative ones.
In his memoirs, Admiral Fulvio Martini, a retired Director of
SISMI, laments that Italy has traditionally not held the intelligence
services in due consideration on account of belated Italian statehood and
the tendency on the part of Italian society to be inward looking. He also
notes that' the contemporary national political milieu is mentally
unprepared to deal with intelligence, an instrument it does not
understand, especially with respect to its utility in support of foreign
policy, and tends to utilize intelligence for unrelated and inappropriate
purposes. He further remarks that the political establishment has not
only allowed a "fanciful and uninformed press" to vilify the intelligence
services, but also failed to protect them. While he considers the current
Intelligence law "not bad" from a political standpoint, he criticizes it as
"flawed" from a professional perspective. It was enacted during an
anomalous period of "national solidarity" between non-Communists and
Communists parliamentarians without seeking the advice of the
practitioners of intelligence, that is, technically competent personnel who
would ultimately be subject to the provisions of that legislation. With
respect to counterintelligence operations, he refers to the difficulties
caused by the suspension of the police forces from the status of judicial
police, thus necessitating in the final stages, involving arrest, the
intervention of personnel extraneous to the intelligence services.3'
In a book-length interview, Franceso Cossiga, a former President of
the Republic and a longstanding student of intelligence, not only concurs
with Admiral Martini's judgment on the misuse and mistreatment of the
intelligence services by the political class, but also advocates a "radical
reform" of the intelligence establishment. Furthermore, he authored a
30. See "The Italian Intelligence and Security Services - The New Law and Its
Risks," East-West Digest, Foreign Affairs Pub. Co. Ltd., Richmond, Surrey, England,
No. 18, Vol. 14, at 689-693.
31. Fulvio Martini, Nome in Codice: Ulisse 16-17, 105-106, 147 (Rizzoli, Milan,
1999).
32. Piero Testoni, Francesco Cossiga: La Passione e la Politica 254 (Rizzoli, Milan
2000).
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concise manual on intelligence in which he defines the Italian
intelligence system as an "anomaly" with respect to those of the Atlantic
Alliance. He proposes a two-track system, based on "positive
intelligence" abroad and "defensive intelligence" at home, coordinated
by an organ under the direct political responsibility of the Premier.33
Finally, in a recent interview, Cossiga laments the failure to safeguard
the operations of the intelligence services and the identity of their
personnel when conducting, for institutional purposes, "unconventional
operations" entailing minor violations of the law, a matter of standing
procedure in other democratic countries.34
Franco Frattini, Chairman of the Intelligence Oversight Committee
during the past legislature and contemporaneously Minister without
portfolio for Public Administration as well as the Premier's delegate to
preside over CESIS during the current legislature, has raised or reiterated
numerous issues that require serious attention or remedial action. These
include, recruitment of personnel possessing needed technical, scientific,
and linguistic skills; enhancement of collection and analysis capabilities;
actual utilization of the intelligence product by the political decision
makers; avoidance of intelligence leaks; need to introduce "functional
safeguards" for operatives; and effective intelligence coordination by the
Office of the Premier.35
Finally, in a well balanced article from which emerges, inter alia,
the delicate relationship between the branches of government, Marco
Valentini, the Executive Editor of Per Aspera ad Veritatem, a
professional open-source journal published by SISDE, tactfully raises the
necessity of safeguarding national security as a value not less precious
than the remaining ones whose protection is afforded by legal
institutions.36
In order to appreciate fully the difficulties that the Italian
intelligence establishment has had to face, a few final and brief
observations are in order with specific reference to allegations of
misconduct and conspiracy theories.
According to the overall misconduct-and-conspiracy thesis, which
can be drawn from a combined reading of older as well as current
33. Francesco Cossiga, Abecedario, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, Catanzaro, 53-54
(2002).
34. Corriere della Sera (Milan), May 5, 2002, at 8.
35. Franco Frattini, "I Nuovi Scenari di Minaccia alla Sicurezza del Paese e i
Compiti dell'Iintelligence," Rivista Trimestrale della Scuola di Perfezionamento per le
Forze di Polizia (Rome), No. 1/2, Jan.-June 2001. See also Corriere della Sera (Milan),
August 12, 2001, at 5 and La Repubblica (Rome) Oct. 25, 2001, at 18.
36. Marco Valentini, "Sicurezza Nazionale, Sicurezza della Repubblica," Per
Aspera ad Veritatem (Rome), No. 22, Jan.-Apr. 2002.
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accusations,37 the Italian political scene was characterized throughout the
Cold War, or even beyond, by "an invisible government," "a hidden
party," and "a double State" and therefore by a "double loyalty" bearer
of "limited sovereignty." All of this was allegedly due to Italy's
membership in NATO and consequential "status of subjection." In this
context, the United States, assisted by "deviant and subservient" Italian
intelligence services and rightist subversive formations which were
infiltrated, controlled or created by American political, diplomatic,
military, and intelligence organizations, are seen as the promoter and
conductor of "a strategy of tension" accompanied by projected or simply
threatened coups, unlawful police measures, and repeated terrorist
attacks aimed not solely at suppressing the former Communist Party, but
also at repressing "all other democratic forces" in the name of NATO.
To date, none of these allegations have been substantiated by court
decisions or by univocal findings of parliamentary committees.
38
Moreover, all known cases of misconduct regarding the Italian
intelligence establishment cannot be attributed to the services as such,
but to individual members. These cases pertain to financial matters and
to other behavior in conjunction with the protection of sources and
undercover operations. While financial misconduct is clearly
reprehensible, the other instances apparently are to a considerable extent
the result of legislation that fails to contemplate contingencies peculiar to
the mission of intelligence and the conduct of related operations.
With respect to the alleged American role in Italy, the following
facts appear to have been conveniently forgotten: the majority of the
Italian electorate has freely and consistently voted in favor of a
democratic system of government to the exclusion of the Communist
model; Italy has likewise freely entered the NATO Alliance; all NATO
partners are juridically equal in this collective defense organization
whose nature is intergovernmental and decidedly not supranational; and,
not least, internal security has always been an attribute of Italian
sovereignty. All surveillance of Communist activists and concern with
their possible access to material classified in the interest of national and
collective security was in fact conducted by the pertinent Italian police
37. A relevant survey of sources includes Marco Sassano, SID e Partito Americano,
Padova, 1975; Sandro Amorosino, "I Servizi di Sicurezza," Politica del Diritto
(Bologna), No. 3-4, 1976; Giuseppe De Lutiis, Storia dei Servizi Segreti in Italia, Editori
Riuniti (the Communist Party affiliated publishing house), Rome, 1984; Gianni Cipriani,
Lo Stato Invisibile, Sperling & Kupfer, Milan, 2002, and Fabrizio Cicchito, Gianluigi Da
Rold, and Franceso Gironda, La Disinformazione in Commissione Stragi, Bietti, Milan,
2002. The latter work is based on a selection of contrasting points of view.
38. Investigations, appeals, and retrials regarding a number of terrorist bombing
attacks with multiple victims dating as far back as the 1970s are still ongoing and are
accompanied by incessant out-of-court allegations and polemics.
[Vol. 21:2
THE ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT
and intelligence agencies given the Communist Party's close political
and economic ties with the Soviet Union and longstanding stance against
Italy's security and defense policies.
Anti-American allegations are, moreover, couched in language and
terminology that reflect both willful ignorance and confusion as to the
workings of U.S. Government departments and agencies as well as to the
nature of the American presence in Italy, particularly in military
installations. These allegations have been repeatedly refuted by the
author of this article, who has held various assignments in Italy as a U.S.
Army junior and senior officer in military police and general staff
39positions.
VI. Contemplated Intelligence Reform under the Current Italian
Government
Criticism of the Intelligence Law and speculation over possible
reform has been going on practically since its enactment.4 ° Moreover, 48
reform bills have been introduced in Parliament since 1979.41
The reform bill titled "Amendments to Law No. 801 of October 24,
1977," which was submitted on June 19, 2002 by the current Council of
Ministers, deserves particular attention. The current Council of
Ministers, as previously noted, is supported by a comfortable majority in
both Chambers of Parliament. Therefore, it could easily muster enough
votes to insure the conversion of this reform bill into law, even without
42the bipartisan support sought on account of the sensitivity of the issue.
A. This "Bill" Consists of Ten Articles Summarized as Follows:
The stated overall objective of the Bill, which leaves the
intelligence oversight provisions and the general structure and
responsibilities of the intelligence establishment unchanged, is manifold.
It entails (1) improved awareness regarding the importance and
usefulness of intelligence in formulating national security policy; (2)
39. Most recently, Vittorfranco Pisano, "Complotti," Area (Rome), No. 70, June
2002.
40. Various media reports attest to this, including Corriere della Sera (Milan), May
23, 1978, at 1; AIPE (Rome), Jan. 2, 1979, at 5-6; and L"Espresso (Milan), Jan. 7, 1979,
at 13.
41. Among these, there is one by Cossiga, who as former President of the. Republic
is now a lifetime Senator by constitutional dictate. For the text of his bill, see the
Appendix of Abecedario, supra note 34, at 61-101.
42. Atti Parlamentari, Senato della Repubblica, Disegno di Legge N. 1513 -
Modifiche ed Integrazioni alla Legge 24 Ottobre 1977, N. 801, Recante Istituzione ed
Ordinamento dei Servizi per l'Infornazione e la Sicurezza e Disciplina del Segreto di
Stato, comunicato alla Presidenza il 19 giugno 2002.
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"functional safeguards" for personnel legitimately involved in
intelligence operations requiring legal flexibility in the interest of State
security; (3) assured full direction and coordination of the intelligence
establishment by the Premier in conformity to the current Intelligence
Law; (4) formulation of procedures for the selection and hiring of
qualified personnel outside of the public sector; and (5) introduction of a
viable regulation of State secrecy.
B. Specific Considerations, Should the Bill Become Law
The composition of CIIS is reduced to five members: the Premier,
who presides, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Defense,
and Economics and Finance. The specific purpose of CIIS is to assist
the Premier in the overall formulation of intelligence and security policy.
CESIS verifies and controls the execution of the Premier's
directives; develops and updates intelligence estimates on the basis of
information provided by SISMI and SISDE; coordinates actions
requiring international cooperation; establishes criteria for document and
archive control; and is tasked with intelligence-awareness promotion,
relations with the media, and institutional communication. The General
Secretariat of CESIS is directly subordinate to the Premier, who, in his
capacity as National Security Authority, determines its internal
organizations and functions.
The Premier, after hearing CIIS, sets forth requirements for the
recruitment and selection of personnel hired from the private sector and
for the training and continuing education of all intelligence personnel.
Crimes not specifically directed at endangering life, physical
integrity, personal liberty, or public health and safety, committed in cases
of exceptional necessity by members of the intelligence and security
services, or by persons tasked as auxiliaries but not subordinate thereto,
are not punishable by law, provided certain conditions are met. Those
conditions entail suitable and indispensable conduct in order to achieve
an institutionally recognized outcome and the impossibility to achieve it
by other means. This conduct must, moreover, be normally authorized
by the Premier, following a request by the Director of the service
involved, or directly by the Director in cases of absolute urgency, but the
latter must inform the Premier within 24 hours through specified
channels. Unlawful authorization or related unlawful conduct carries a
prison term of 2 to 5 years. If an authorization has been granted, the
judicial authorities may not commence proceedings, but they may raise a
jurisdictional issue before the Constitutional Court. Secrecy applies to
all proceedings.
The Premier, after informing the Minister of Defense or of the
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Interior, depending on the circumstances, can authorize either Director to
issue, Solely for institutional purposes, false documents in order to
provide operational personnel with suitable cover. Similar rules govern
the authorization to conduct, for analogous purposes, economic activities
at home or abroad.
The obligation on the part of the Government to report semi-
annually to the Parliament on the intelligence and security policy and its
results is confirmed, together with the prerogatives of the Parliamentary
Oversight Committee already set forth in the Intelligence Law.
However, various precautions are specifically added. CIIS is to provide
the Parliamentary Oversight Committee with additional information that
it may request from time to time. But the latter is specifically barred
from access to any information regarding sources, assistance from
foreign intelligence services, the identity of operatives, operational
frameworks, and ongoing or completed operations whose disclosure is
deemed dangerous by the Premier for the security of the Republic.
Moreover, the Speakers of both Chambers must promote the adoption of
suitable procedures for the protection of classified information submitted
to the Parliamentary Oversight Committee.
The Premier, in his/her capacity as National Security Authority,
makes the determination of State secrecy. It applies to all matters where
knowledge, outside of authorized institutional bodies having an "absolute
need to -know," may endanger or damage the constitutionally safeguarded
values already indicated in the Intelligence Law. State secrecy expires
after 15 years, except for particularly sensitive "acts, documents, things,
or information" pertaining to such matters as military security systems
and intelligence sources and methods. After 40 years and following
declassification, all formerly classified documents, including those
issued from the intelligence establishment, are turned over to the State
Archives. The Premier can extend this term by 10 years with respect to
matters of particular sensitivity.
When the judiciary needs to acquire documentation or other
material in possession of the intelligence and security services, it must
indicate precisely what it requires. The pertinent acquisition can take
place only at the central offices of the respective services. Access to all
other offices is denied. Whenever documentation or other material
requested by the judiciary issues from a foreign intelligence service or a
security organ of an international organization with the proviso that it
will not be disclosed, the Premier must consult with said service or
organ. If the head of the office holding documentation or other material
requested by the judiciary claims State secrecy, said documentation or
other material must be forwarded to the Premier, who must authorize its
release within 60 days or uphold State secrecy. As National Security
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Authority, the Premier must declassify all releasable documentation and
other material prior to its release.
The judiciary can raise a jurisdictional issue with the Constitutional
Court should it consider the Premier's confirmation of State secrecy
unjustified. If the Constitutional Court concurs with the judiciary, State
secrecy can no longer be claimed in proceedings relating to the same
event.
The rapidity with which this reform bill could be converted into law
will depend in part on whether the governing parliamentary coalition, the
center-right "pole," wishes to do so with the nearly full support of the
parliamentary opposition. Unanimous support is unlikely because the
remaining Communist hard-liners and the Greens will vote in the
negative.
The urgency to upgrade the viability of the intelligence system in an
era characterized by multidimensional and multidirectional risks, both
domestic and transnational, likely will bolster the bill's conversion into
law. The impact of September 11, 2001 and its aftermath on all allied
and friendly countries rendered this need to upgrade even more
disquieting.
VII. Concluding Considerations
Conversion of the proposed Bill into law may neither solve all
problems nor simplify all challenges, but it would undoubtedly constitute
a reasonable step in the right direction. Such a commentary is prompted
by this author's pragmatic considerations. It is not an unconditional
endorsement of the proposed reform legislation.
A single intelligence service, rather than two services subject to a
coordinating organ, as called for by both the current system and the
reform Bill, could prove to be considerably more streamlined and
efficient. This is particularly true in the many instances where the
bureaucratic process tends to be proverbially slow, regardless of specific
political, cultural, sociological, or psychological factors and
environments.
This hypothesized single intelligence service would be organized as
a separate and autonomous public entity. It would be composed of
technically and geopolitically oriented divisions and offices operating
under a civilian or military director appointed by and immediately
answerable to the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive's prerogatives
would include policy formulation, overall mission tasking, decision-
making, and upholding State secrecy when reasonable and appropriate.
This entity would be endowed with built-in capabilities for the
collection, evaluation, and analysis of information, as well as the conduct
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of covert action, understood as a complementary intelligence function
requiring specific approval in all highly sensitive cases. Therefore, here
would be no need for another organ at a higher level to supplement the
capabilities of the intelligence service.
The removal of the intelligence services from their current
respective Ministries would in no way downgrade these Ministries'
operational capabilities. The police organizations as well as the military
establishment would retain sufficient intelligence capability organic to
their specific mission and institutional methodology (i.e., police
intelligence and military intelligence). Moreover, cooperation between
the hypothesized single intelligence service and other governmental
departments and agencies would be mandated by law.
A bicameral oversight committee, or perhaps separate committees
for the two chambers of Parliament, would safeguard a healthy system of
checks and balances. No less significantly, the committees would serve
the purpose of utilizing the intelligence product in the interest of
legislation within the boundaries of national and collective security. The
latter function would be highly emphasized.
Moreover, any challenge to the Chief Executive's upholding of
State secrecy would still be brought before a specialized section of the
judiciary having exclusive jurisdiction and duly cleared to examine
classified material.
In the interest of security procedures during both the investigative
and arrest stages, special provisions would be made for the retention of
judicial police status on the part of personnel assigned to
counterintelligence. Their jurisdiction would be limited to security
offenses.
Finally, in order to simplify procedures affecting temporary duty
and subsequent return to their parent organizations, military personnel
assigned to the intelligence service because of special skills or other
requirements would simply be detailed thereto without loss of military
status.
Realistically, however, given the current Italian system of
government and the workings of Italian politics, the times do not appear
to be ripe for an intelligence reform such as the one concisely
hypothesized here.
Consequently, the passage of legislation along the lines of the Bill
outlined under the previous heading would constitute as appreciable of
an achievement as can be prudentially expected under present
circumstances. On the positive side, it would to some degree streamline
the system, provide for the hiring of select personnel in certain skill
areas, and above all else afford badly needed operational safeguards, thus
enhancing mission potential at a time when national and collective
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security requirements are in fact demanding.
As this article goes to press, media accounts report that the Bill
proposed by the majority coalition is being discussed with the opposition
in order to reach a broad consensus based on compromise.43 While
cautious optimism is warranted, it should not be forgotten that political
compromise in professional and technical areas has often failed to
produce positive results. Hopefully, the intelligence law will not
necessitate re-visitation under the onslaught of emergency conditions.
43. II Tempo (Rome), Nov. 13, 2001, at 5.
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